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The influence of government size on economic growth and 
life satisfaction. A case study from Japan. 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the years 1979 and 1996 to 
examine how the relationship between government size and life satisfaction changes. 
The major findings are: (1) Government size has a detrimental effect on life satisfaction 
when government size impedes economic growth in the economic developing stage. 
However, this effect clearly decreases when government size is not associated with 
economic growth in the developed stage. (2) Particularized trust is positively associated 
with life satisfaction of females but not with that of males. Such a tendency becomes 
more remarkable in the developed stage.  These results are unchanged when the 
endogeneity bias caused by local government size and proxies of trust are controlled for.   
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1. Introduction 
 
How and why do people become happy? Undoubtedly, this been among the most 
important questions for policy makers (Layard, 2006), and since the early 1990s, 
researchers in the fields of economics and political economics have begun to pay it 
attention (Frey & Stutzer, 2002).  Increasing numbers of works attempting to analyze 
individual subjective well-being have considered not only economic factors such as 
income level and consumption but also various other ones such as formal and informal 
institutions1. It is widely acknowledged that the government plays an important role in 
society. Therefore, in respect to public choice, exploring government size is now thought 
to be a major issue and empirical works have investigated its impact on subjective-well 
being2. Bjørnskov et al. (2007) presents evidence that government size can negatively 
                                                   
1 For instance, informal institutions such as social trust or social capital (e.g., Bjørnskov, 
2003; Helliwell, 2006) and formal institution (Frey & Stutzer, 2000; Bjørnskov et al., 
2008c) are regarded as critical in determining subjective well-being. 
2 Bureaucratic rent and decentralization are considered to be determinants of life 
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affect on life satisfaction, which is in line with the view of public choice theory that 
government size becomes larger than the optimal one to benefit country‟s citizens 
because governments actually do not act as „benevolent dictators‟. However, this finding 
is deduced from limited cross country data, and the dynamic aspect has not been taken 
into account. It is worthwhile examining whether the negative association between 
government size and well-being is stable over time because dynamic factors influence on 
life satisfaction (Bjørnskov et al., 2008d).  
The conjecture that resources are allocated less efficiently by larger governments, 
leading to lower economic growth is supported by several report (e.g., Landau, 1985; 
Peden & Bradley, 1989; Dar & AmirKhalkhalim 2002; Fölster & Herekson, 2002). On 
the other hand, some researchers find no discernable relationship between government 
size and economic growth (e.g., Ram, 1986; Bairam, 1990; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; 
Mendoza et al., 1997)3. Guseh (1997) pays attention to the institutional features of 
countries and points out that government size has a detrimental effect on economic 
growth in developing countries, but that this negative effect is clearly mitigated by 
democracy4. As shown by Acemoglu et al. (2008), per capita income is positively related 
to the rise of democracy. This leads me to presume that a matured democracy viewed as 
an outcome of the rise in per capita income decreases government inefficiency, leading 
to an alleviation of the negative influence of government size on life satisfaction5. 
However, no work has attempted to examine whether the effect of government size on 
                                                                                                                                                     
satisfaction (Luechinger et al., 2006; Bjørnskov et al., 2008 b) 
3 There is argument that the relationship between government size and growth is 
non-linear (e.g., Barro 1997; Grossman, 1988; Chen & Lee, 2005; Angelopoulos et al., 
2008). 
4 The degree of democracy is thought to play a crucial role in improving economic 
efficiency (Feld & Savioz, 1997). 
5 It is not observed that the degree of democracy alleviates the detrimental influence 
caused by government size in cross country analysis (Bjørnskov et al., 2007).  
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life satisfaction changes under a dynamic process of institutional change. 
As well as government size, it is argued that various factors such as social trust, 
human capital, and age can be considered as determinants of life satisfaction 
(Bjørnskov et al., 2007; Bjørnskov et al., 2008 c; Scoppa & Ponzo 2008). The 
determinants of life satisfaction appear to vary between different periods of time, even 
in the same country.  This might be in part because formal and informal institutional 
changes appear to influence life styles and interpersonal relationships.  
Japan has experienced rapid economic growth, especially in the postwar period 
(Yamamura et al., 2005; Yamamura & Shin, 2007). Such growth inevitably transformed 
traditional Japanese society into a modern one; this is reflected, for instance, in the rise 
in the social standing of women. It seems that in the wake of changes in circumstance, 
the generational and gender gaps in the way life is perceived have widened6. Thus 
Japan is a country suitable for comparing different circumstances across generations 
and genders. Survey data on Japan, from 1979 and 1996 cover life satisfaction across 3 
age groups and both genders.  This data allows me to compare the determinants of life 
satisfaction between different points in time and across generations and genders. The 
present paper uses this data to assess the effects of government size and other 
socio-economic factors on life satisfaction. It also looks at how these effects vary under 
the influence of societal structural changes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Features of Japanese society 
and changes in life satisfaction are briefly reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 explains the 
data and methods used.  Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations. The final 
                                                   
6 Empirical research concerning trust in Japan presents evidence that there is a 
distinct difference in the degree of trust between genders (Yamamura, 2008a), and 
across generations (Yamamura, 2008 b). 
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section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Review of modern Japanese society and life satisfaction 
 
As is more fully explained in section 3, the rate of people who feel satisfied with life is 
used as a measure of life satisfaction index. Data is available separately for males and 
females across 3 generations at the prefecture level. Change in life satisfaction is 
exhibited in Table 1 (a); it shows that life satisfaction significantly increases from 1979 
to 1996, and that the degree of increase for females is consistently higher than that for 
males. Government size is measured by the total share of government expenditure in 
prefectural income and is presented in table 1 (b).7 From this data it can be seen that 
government size increased slightly, despite the difference between 1979 and 1996 being 
statistically insignificant. This shows that the rise in life satisfaction seems to be 
associated with an increase in government size, which does not correspond to the 
conjecture derived from public choice theory. The level of real per capita income in 1996 
is higher than that in 1979, whereas the 5 years growth rate during 1996-2001 is nearly 
0, distinctly lower than that for 1979-19848. This implies that the end of the 1970s can 
                                                   
7 Prefectural GDP cannot be obtained in 1979 and so prefectural income is used instead. 
There are various measures of government size such as the government share of 
consumption in GDP (Bjørnskov et al., 2007), total tax share in GDP (Fölster & 
Herekson, 2001), total government share in GDP (Grossman, 1988; Fölster & Herekson, 
2001). Chen and Lee (2005) used three measures; share of total government 
expenditure in GDP, government investment expenditure in GDP and government 
consumption expenditure in GDP. It should be noted that the way of measuring 
government size is thought to influence estimation results when the relationship 
between government size and economic growth is examined (Landau, 1985). 
Nevertheless, in this paper, the main focus falls on an assessment of the effect of 
government size on life satisfaction, which is not explained by rigorous growth theory. 
Hence, in this paper, I use total expenditure comprised of various types of expenditure 
at a prefectural level.   
8 This paper looks at the efficiency of government in 1979 and 1996, since people's 
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be characterized as a low income and growth stage, and the mid-1990s as a high income 
and steady growth period9. In this paper, 1979 and 1996 are defined as developing and 
developed stages, respectively. 
Although there appears to be a positive relationship between income level and life 
satisfaction in Table 1, most existing reports provide no evidence that income level is 
positively associated with life satisfaction (Frey & Stutzer, 2002). If an increase in 
income leads to a rise in individual‟s income aspirations (Stutzer, 2004), there might be 
another channel through which income influences life satisfaction. Thus channel, if it 
exists, has not been taken into account in the existing literature. I aim to shed light on 
an indirect effect of income increase on life satisfaction, rather than a direct one. It 
seems plausible that a democracy tends to be a mature one when income levels reach 
those of developed countries (Acemoglu et al., 2008). If this holds true, it would be 
worthwhile considering how a matured democracy resulting from an income increase is 
related to life satisfaction. For instance, a possible channel can be considered as follows, 
“stricter democratic control might restrain bureaucrats‟ deleterious impact, lead to 
efficiency gains, and increase people‟s happiness” (Bjørnskov et al., 2007, pp.270-271).   
A cursory examination of Figure 1 shows a slightly negative relationship between 
government size and life satisfaction, in both 1979 and 1996, which is in line with public 
choice theory. From Figure 2 (a), government size is negatively related with economic 
                                                                                                                                                     
aspirations appear to change over time (Easterlin, 1995); therefore, the efficiency at a 
different point in time has less impact on life satisfaction than the present efficiency. 
Previous works have focused on the growth rate between past and current years and 
assessed its influence on life satisfaction (DiTella et al., 2003). The growth rate between 
past and current years reflects past efficiency, rather than current efficiency since 
economic growth can be considered as an outcome of efficient resource allocation. For 
this reason, I look at economic growth between current and subsequent years. 
9 It should be noted that Japan experienced miraculous economic growth during the 
1950s and 1960s (Hayami, 2001). Therefore, the high growth period in Japan is 
generally considered to be the two decades prior to 1970s.  
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growth. For a closer examination, I compare its relationship in 1979 with that in 1996. 
Figure 2 (b) demonstrates a negative relationship in 1979 whereas Figure 2 (c) exhibits 
a slightly positive one in 1996. For a closer examination, simple regression estimations 
are conducted and their results presented in Table A1, in the APPENDIX. Definitions of 
the independent variables used in Table A1 are shown in Table 3. I see from Table A1 
that signs of government size are negative and positive, in 1979 and 1996, respectively, 
and are statistically significant. It follows from this that government size has a negative 
effect on the growth rate in 1979, whereas it has a positive effect on growth in 1996. 
This result is unchanged when other variables are included as independent variables. 
That observed in Figure 1 and Table A1 leads me to argue that government size 
impeded economic efficiency in 1979 but not in 1996. Such an improvement of the 
government size effect on growth is reflected in the fact that the public sector of Japan 
was more efficient than those of other industrialized countries in 2000 (Afonso et al., 
2005).  
The supply of public goods is determined through a political process, leading their 
supply to be different from the optimum level in terms of economics. It is widely 
acknowledged that bureaucrats in the government sector have an incentive to maximize 
their budget (Niskanen 1971). The absence of profit incentive induces government 
organizations to be less efficient (Buchanan & Wagner, 1977). As a consequence, a 
government tends to become oversized and produce an oversupply of unnecessary public 
goods. The cost for the supply of public goods is financed through taxation. People are 
thus likely to criticize government policy when the cost of public goods outweighs their 
benefit. Nevertheless, a government has abundant information, which ordinary people 
encounter difficulty in accessing. As a result of the information asymmetry, 
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“government can easily manipulate information to inflate the value of the public goods 
they want to supply” (Hayami 2001, p.227). Such manipulation is thought to be easier in 
the economic developing stage, since the average education level of the population is 
lower and the mass media is not sufficiently developed. As shown in Table 1 (b), the 
human capital index of 1996 is significantly larger than that of 1979, suggesting that 
people become more educated in the process of economic development. It also seems 
appropriate to point out that the emergence of Windows 95 led people to have easier 
access various information through the internet. Thanks to such a change of 
circumstances accompanied by economic development, information asymmetry between 
government and ordinary people decreases. Thus, it becomes more difficult for the 
government to manipulate information. Under these conditions, democracy functions 
well, which seems to be reflected in governmental policy. As a consequence, budget 
allocations among various public goods become more efficient, promoting growth. This 
might be why the detrimental effect of government size on efficiency disappears in the 
process of economic development. These considerations lead me to advance the 
Hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Government size is negatively related with life satisfaction in the 
developing stage when government size causes inefficiency. Subsequently, negative 
relationships between government size and life satisfaction disappear in the 
developed stage when government size does not cause inefficiency.   
I now look more closely at life satisfaction in Japan. Life satisfaction is categorized 
into genders and generations in 1979 and 1996, as set out in Table 2. From Table 2, I 
found it interesting that the degree of life satisfaction for the 16-40 year old generation 
is lower than for other generations for both genders in 1979, whereas that of the 16-40 
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year old generation becomes higher than the others in 1996. World War II finished 51 
years before 1996; thus the 16-40 generation in 1996 can be considered as the only 
generation of people born in the post-World War II period among those generations in 
Table 2. This generation was educated in a democratic environment and grew up with 
the growth of the Japanese economy10. The circumstances in which Japanese people 
lives changed were partly under the guidance of international society, and partly 
because of strong citizen empowerment during the postwar period. For instance, Japan 
ratified the United Nation‟s “Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women” in 197911. What is more, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law for Men and Women was promulgated in 1985. It was partially 
amended in 1997 and came into force in 199912. Women thus gained in social standing 
and had a larger influence on the social lives of Japanese in the 1990s than in the 1970s. 
This seems to lead to a gender difference in life satisfaction13. Therefore, as noted later, 
estimations are conducted by splitting samples into male and female to examine this 
gender difference. The postwar generation‟s way of thinking and life style has been 
influenced by their education and are thus congruent to the matured democracy 
circumstances of Japan in the 1990s. This might be one of reasons why the postwar 
generation tends to be more satisfied with life than other generations in the developed 
stage. 
 
                                                   
10 Pre-war Japanese education emphasized an emperor-centered historiography based 
on state Shintoism, which portrayed Japan as a divine country under the unbroken rule 
of the imperial family. Prewar education was radically different to that under the 
democracy introduced in the post war period.  
11 See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/. 
12 http://www.cc.matsuyama-u.ac.jp/~tamura/kintouhou.htm (in Japanese). 
13 Recently, difference in life satisfaction between genders has drawn the attention of 
researchers (Booth & van Ours, 2009). 
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3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data  
    Table 3 includes the definitions of variables and the means for data analyzed from 
1979 and 1996. The life satisfaction and trust data used here are from surveys were 
carried by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nihon Hoso Kyokai) in 1979 and 1996, 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation (1979, 1996). Respondents were asked, “Do you feel 
satisfaction with your life?”. There were four choices; “yes”, “More yes than no”, “no”, 
“No response”.  Male and female respondents were recorded separately, at the 
prefecture level.  Therefore, using this data I can calculate the rate of respondents who 
responded positively as “yes” and “I would rather say yes”.  I use this rate as the 
measure of satisfaction. There were two questions related to trust; (1) “Are there many 
persons whom you can trust among your neighbors?”, (2) “Are there many persons 
whom you can trust among your relatives?”. The rates of respondents who said “yes” to 
each question are used as the measure of trust.  As discussed later, two kinds of proxies 
for trust are used to assess the different features of trust on life satisfaction.  
 Per capita real incomes and population are derived from Index Publishing (2006). 
The Gini coefficients of income in 1979 and 1994 are from the Statistics Bureau of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications14.  The human capital index is taken 
from the Hi-Stat data base15.  Other variables are from Asahi Shimbun (2004).   
 
                                                   
14 Gini data at the prefecture level are obtained every five years; as 1996 data is not 
available, I used 1994 data. 
15 Data is available at 
http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~fukao/japanese/data/fuken2000/pfactor.xls. This 
prefecture-level panel data base was constructed by Fukao and Yue (2000).  
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3.2.  Methods 
 
  In line with the discussion above, the estimated function of trust takes the following 
form: 
Ln(SATISFY) itsu= 0 + 1 Ln(GOVSCAL) it + 2Ln(NETRUST)itsu + 
3Ln(RETRUST)itsu + 4Ln(INCOM)it +5Ln(POP)it + 6Ln(GINI)it + 
7Ln(HC)it +8Age1640s+9Age4160s +9Femaleu+10Year_1979t  
+εitsu,  
 
where SATISFY represents the rate of trust in prefecture i, for year t, generation s and 
gender u.  ‟s represents the regression parameters. εitsu represents the error term.   
The structure of the data covers two years, 1979 and 1996, and is for 47 prefectures. 
Generation dummies are included to capture the generational effects. Y1640 and Y4160 
stand for the 16-40 and 41-60 generations, respectively. The default generation is the 
generation over 60 years old. Female and Year_1979 are dummy variables aiming to 
control for gender and year effects, respectively. To make interpretation easier, the 
dependent variable and all independent variables, with the exception of dummy 
variables, take log forms. Therefore, their coefficient, , means the elasticity, which 
allows me to directly compare the degree of impact of each variable.  
Since causality between satisfaction and government size is not clear, the endogenous 
problem must be addressed. Satisfied people appear to be lenient in their evaluation of 
government performance, resulting in excessive government expenditure. That is to say, 
life satisfaction seemingly influences government size; thus Bjørnskov et al. (2007) 
attempt to control for the endogeneity of government size. Furthermore, satisfied people 
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are also likely to trust others, resulting in an endogenous bias. Inevitably, it is 
necessary to control for endogenous bias not only from government size but also from 
trust. GMM estimation allows me to generalize the covariance structure of ε and 
therefore the estimation result is valid even if ε is heteroscedastic (Greene 1997, pp. 
742-744).  To alleviate these potential endogenous problems and heteroscedasticity, 
GMM 2SLS estimation was employed.  
  The effects of each variable on life satisfaction are discussed later in this section. The 
hypothesis raised in the previous section leads me to expect the coefficient sign of 
GOVSCAL to be negative, while its absolute value for 1996 becomes smaller than that 
of 1979. For the purpose of examining the robustness of the estimation results, an 
alternative specification model, which included the interaction term of GOVSCAL and 
Year_1979, was also conducted. This cross term would become negative if the result of 
the alternative specification is consistent with the argument above.   
Trust is considered to carry the advantage that transaction costs are reduced in a 
long-term transaction network based on trust; something that can be seen in the 
subcontract system in the Japanese manufacturing industry (Asanuma, 1989). I thus 
generally predict the signs of trust to be positive, as in some studies (Bjørnskov, 2003; 
Helliwell, 2003, 2006; Bjørnskov et al., 2007). Interpersonal trust can be roughly 
divided into generalized and particularized trust (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov 2006). “The 
central idea distinguishing generalized from particularized trust is how inclusive your 
moral community is.” (Uslaner, 2002: 26-27).  People with generalized trust have 
positive views toward both their own in-group and out-groups, whereas those with 
particularized trust have positive views of their own in-group but a negative attitude 
toward groups to which they do not belong. Trust in relatives can convincingly be taken 
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as particularized trust because a blood relationship is relatively stable and closed to 
others 16 . As pointed out by Uslaner (2002), neighborhood trust shares the 
characteristics not only of particularized trust but also of generalized trust. A lack of the 
population mobility induces neighbors to repeatedly interact with each other so that 
interpersonal trust is formed among them through long term relationships. This can be 
regarded as particularized trust. On the other hand, assuming that there is much 
mobility in the population of a community, strangers are more apt to become neighbors. 
In such a situation, trust formed among neighbors can be taken as generalized trust. 
These differences in characteristics between RETRUST and NETRUST might lead to 
different outcomes.  
Economic factors are captured by incorporating INCOM, POP and GINI as 
independent variables. Above all, INCOM is included to empirically test the 
presumption derived from the traditional economic theory that individuals gain 
satisfaction from income. It is known that people encounter difficulties in making a 
success of collective action, although it plays a critical role in increasing benefits for 
society (Olson, 1965). A previous case study of Japan found that income inequality 
hampers collective action (Yamamura, 2008c). As well, income inequality is considered 
to harm health status (Kawachi et al., 1997). I thus predict that the sign of GINI 
becomes negative.  
It is acknowledged that human capital increases income (Becker, 1964). If this holds 
true, human capital will improve life satisfaction. As suggested above, however, income 
level is already controlled for. Accordingly, I should interpret HC to capture the impact 
of human capital on life satisfaction through other channels. For instance, under the 
                                                   
16 Although other people can become relatives through marriage, this effect seems to be 
relatively small. 
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same constraint, more educated individuals seem to consume goods more efficiently 
because they can more easily access useful information. This is why the anticipated sign 
of HC is positive.   
  Besides the variables mentioned above, other factors seem to influence life 
satisfaction; for instance, individual characteristics such as marital status and 
membership in certain groups, particularly religious ones17. Circumstances such as the 
crime rate are also thought to affect life satisfaction. It is reasonable that people who 
are dissatisfied with married life are likely to divorce. Intuitively, as a result of 
emotional instability, unhappy people tend to become members of certain groups to seek 
relief, or for criminal purposes. Such points lead me to argue that these variables result 
in endogenous bias when they are included in the estimation function. As mentioned 
earlier in this section, government size and trust can be considered as endogenous 
variables. Too many endogenous variables should not be included, since it is more 
difficult to control for bias as endogenous variables increase. However, some variables 
are added, but only when alternative estimations using the cross term of government 
size and year dummy are conducted. 
 
4. Results 
Table 4 shows the results of the OLS estimations.   Tables 5 and 6 report the 
results of the GMM 2SLS estimations. Table 7 shows an alternative specification, which 
includes the interaction term of government size and year dummy. In Table 7, I focus on 
the results of the interaction term to mainly examine the hypothesis. Therefore, in 
                                                   
17 One‟s personality and values seem to influence life satisfaction. The aggregated level 
data used in this research, however, do not allow me to control for these unobserved 
individual effects. Further research using individual level panel data is called for to 
control for these individual effects.  
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Table 7, the results of other control variables are not reported to save space.  
In Tables 5 and 7, to instrument for RETRUST and NETRUST, I employ the 
following variables18; logarithms for changing residence within prefecture, immigrants 
from other prefectures, and for the number of fire fighting teams, as well as 4 region 
dummies19. As discussed earlier, social trust seems to collapse through population 
mobility captured by changing residence and as an immigrant (Yamamura 2008a). A 
local voluntary organization such as a fire fighting team generalizes trust among its 
members through interpersonal communication in cooperative activities (Yamamura, 
2008b). These variables are relevant determinants of the degree of trust and are not 
directly associated with life satisfaction. In Table 6, not only RETRUST and NETRUST 
but also government size is considered as an endogenous variable. Hence, added to the 
instrument variables as above, I use a logarithm for the number of natural disasters 
because government spending increases to recover from it.  
In each table, the results for all samples are shown in Columns (1)- (3). The results of 
subsamples consisting of 1979 and 1996 years are in columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9), 
respectively. Furthermore, both male and female samples are used in columns (1), (4), 
and (7) in each of the Tables. Male samples are in columns (2), (5), and (8) in each of the 
Tables. Female samples are in columns (3), (6), and (9). 
 
4.1.   OLS model. 
                                                   
18 Table 7 shows not only results of GMM 2SLS but also those of OLS. 
19 Kanto region dummy, Chubu region dummy, Kinki region dummy, and Urban areas 
dummy.  The Kanto region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Ibaragi, Tochigi, Gunma, 
Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and Kanagawa. The Chubu region is comprised of 9 prefectures; 
Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, and Aichi. The 
Kinki region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and 
Wakayama. Urban areas consist of 5 prefectures; Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and 
Hyogo. 
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I begin by looking at the key variable, GOVESCAL. As shown in columns (1)-(3), 
the results estimated using 1979 and 1996 year samples show significant negative signs. 
The absolute value for males is 0.08, which is two times larger than that for females. If 
samples are restricted to the 1979 year, they continue to indicate significant positive 
signs and their absolute values become larger, between 0.09 - 0.20. On the other hand, 
the results obtained for the 1996 year samples show that they are not statistically 
significant and absolute values are between 0.002 - 0.02; therefore, showing 
considerable decline although their signs are negative. These results are consistent with 
the Hypothesis presented in Section 2.  
As for trust, signs of NETRUST are not stable and are statistically 
insignificant, which does not correspond to the anticipation. This might be partly 
because that the results of NETRUST suffer from endogeneity bias.  On the other 
hand, as expected, coefficient signs of RETRUST are mostly significant positive signs, 
with the exception of columns (5) and (8). Compared with NETRUST, RETRUST is 
more likely to be determined exogenously because a kinship relation was formed in the 
distant past. As a result of this, the results of RETRUST are less inclined to be biased. 
In 1979, the magnitude of the female coefficient is 0.24, which is approximately 5 times 
larger than that of the male one. A similar result is obtained in 1996.  
Consistent with previous research (Frey & Stutzer, 2002), signs of INCOM are 
not stable and therefore the level of income does not play a critical role in improving life 
satisfaction. By contrast, in all estimations, I found GINI to take the expected negative 
sign, although not statistically significant in 1996, which is congruent to the 
anticipation and to the assertion that life satisfaction is influenced by the income of 
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surrounding people (Scoppa and Ponzo, 2008). Negative signs of HC in 1979 are not 
consistent with the prediction, whereas positive signs in 1996 are in line with it. In my 
interpretation, educated individuals are more inclined to have many opportunities to 
work when the market mechanism functions more effectively.  That is, a university 
education confers considerable advantages for job seeking. Abundant opportunity to 
work leads not only to an increase in income but also to a reduction of the likelihood of 
unemployment. Therefore, the expected sign of HC is positive and its absolute value is 
larger in 1996 than in 1979 because Japan‟s life time employment system has been 
undergoing gradual collapse and a more market orientated mechanism appears to be 
working its way into the Japanese labor market. 
It is interesting to observe that the coefficients of Age_1640 and Age_4160  exhibit 
negative signs with the exception of Age_1640 in 1996. This implies that, compared 
with the over 60 years old generation, younger generations such as Age_1640 and 
Age_4160 are less likely to feel satisfied with life, with the exception of Age_1640 in 
1996. The estimation results correspond to Table 2. The education obtained by the 
generation born post-World War II is considered to be aligned with democracy, much 
different from the education received by the previous generation. The circumstances of 
modern Japan are more influenced by democracy than before the end of World War II. 
It seems thus an appropriate argument that the relationship between postwar period 
education and modern Japanese life is complementary. As a consequence, the life 
satisfaction rate of the postwar educated generation was higher than that of the older 
generation in the developed stage. Hence, I find the extent to which human capital 
matches up to formal political institutions to be important20. Significant positive signs 
                                                   
20 Transition economies are expected to confront the same difficulties since there seems 
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of Female in all estimations correspond to the results of DiTella et al. (2003).   
 
4.2.   2SLS model.  
 
Before turning to consider the coefficients of each variable in Tables 5 and 6, I first 
check the validity of the instrumental variable method.  An over-identification test is 
used to test the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated to the error 
term21.  As in the third row from the bottom, the results fail to reject the hypothesis 
and so all estimations pass the over-identification test.  Overall, the choice of 
instruments is valid in all estimations and so the GMM 2SLS estimation is applicable.  
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, the results of GOVSCAL are unchanged from Table 4 as 
discussed above after controlling for endogenous bias; this strongly supports the 
Hypothesis concerning the effect of government size. With respect to trust, NETRUST 
shows consistently positive signs in all estimations, and is statistically significant in 
1996.   
As for RETRUST, I found it surprising that in 1996 the male coefficient takes a negative 
sign whereas the female one takes a significant positive sign. Any difference from Table 
4 might be because of an alleviation of endogenous bias by the GMM 2SLS method. I 
interpret the results of RETRUST as follows; compared with males, Japanese females 
are less inclined to take full-time jobs and so they don‟t set up inter-personal networks 
                                                                                                                                                     
to be differences in education in considering the market economy between communist 
and post communist periods. It is worthwhile examining the matching problem between 
a communist generation and a modern market oriented society.  
21 In a GMM context, when there are more moment conditions than parameters to be 
estimated, a chi-square test can be used to test the overidentifying restrictions. The test 
statistic is called the Hansen's J statistic. Therefore, I report J statistics instead of 
Sargan's. 
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in the work place. Furthermore, market information is incomplete especially in the 
labor market, whereas long-term repeated personal interactions within a relative 
network increase the information shared between network members. Females tend to 
allocate time to interact with relatives because a woman‟s time allocated to work could 
be shorter than a man‟s. This circumstance induces females to rely on informal relative 
networks rather than market ones. For instance, matching between a child and a 
strange babysitter is very difficult, leading to a rise in the transaction cost. In Japan, 
when a mother raising a child cannot care for her child, she is inclined to rely on 
relatives via a non-market network rather than demand a babysitter through the 
market. In the developed stage where the market has matured, interpersonal 
relationships become relatively scarce. Accordingly, an interpersonal network becomes 
more valuable, causing trust between people to make a greater contribution to female 
life satisfaction than before.  
As for generation dummies, Tables 5 and 6 continue to demonstrate significant 
positive signs of Age_1640 in 1996, although other results show mixed signs. This leads 
me to argue that postwar education is robustly complementary to the circumstances of 
the 1990s.  
I have presented various estimated results.  Taking the results together, I 
concluded that those in this section were consistent with and supportive of the 
hypothesis and argument concerning other socio-economic determinants put forward in 
the preceding section.  
 
4.3. Robustness check. 
    Table 7 (a), (b) and (c) shows results of the OLS estimations in columns(1) and (2) 
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and those of GMM 2SLS in columns(3) and (4). In columns (1) and (3), the same control 
variables as in Table 4 are incorporated. In addition to these variables, the number of 
crimes and the number of divorces are included as control variables22. Their results are, 
however, not reported to save space. As in the third row from the bottom, the results fail 
to reject the hypothesis and so estimations using GMM 2SLS pass the 
over-identification test. 
 Looking at Table 7 (a) shows that the interaction terms of GOVESCAL and Year_1979 
yield significant negative signs in all estimations. This implies that government size 
was more negatively associated with life satisfaction in 1979 than in 1996, which 
supports the hypothesis. What is more, signs of the interaction term are consistently 
negative in Table 7 (b) and (c). Generally, absolute values in (b) are larger than those in 
(c), suggesting that difference of GOVESCAL effects between 1979 and 1996 for males is 
clearly larger than that for females. What is observed in Figure 7 is consistent with the 
findings presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6; meaning that these estimation results are 
robust. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
That government size has a detrimental effect on the degree of life satisfaction from 
the view point of public choice theory is a plausible conclusion. However, a country 
transits from the developing to the developed stage in tandem with increases in income 
accompanied by institutional change. There appears to be a positive relationship 
between income and democracy; thus economic growth is thought to influence life 
                                                   
22 It should be noted, as argued earlier, that the numbers of crimes and divorces 
possibly lead to endogenous bias. 
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satisfaction through a rise in democracy. Another issue then arises, that of whether the 
negative influence of government size on life satisfaction continues to be stable over 
time in the process of economic and institutional development. Little is known about 
this issue. Therefore, this paper used Japanese prefecture-level data for the years 1979 
and 1996 to investigate how government size is associated with life satisfaction. The 
situations for each year can be roughly characterized as follows. Favorable economic 
growth was achieved although per capita income level was not so high in 1979, whereas 
per capital income reached a high level despite the low economic growth rate in 1996. 
Thus 1979 and 1996 are defined as developing and developed stages, respectively. 
Through a GMM 2SLS estimation, which allowed me to control for endogeneity bias, 
I found as follows: (1) Government size had a detrimental effect on life satisfaction when 
it impeded economic growth in 1979. By contrast, the negative impact of the 
government size effect on life satisfaction disappeared in 1996 when government size 
was not associated with economic growth. (2) Particularized trust is positively 
associated with female life satisfaction but not with male. Such a tendency becomes 
more remarkable in the developed stage.  These results do not change in the developed 
stage when I control for the endogeneity bias caused by local government size and 
proxies of trust. (3). The degree of life satisfaction of the generation born in the 
post-World War II period is remarkably higher than other generations, for both males 
and females.  
The findings above clarify that government size is not associated with life 
satisfaction if it does not impede economic growth, consistent with the findings of 
Bjørnskov et al. (2007) that government effectiveness alleviates the negative effects of 
government size. Nonetheless, achieving a mature democracy seems to take a long time. 
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I conjecture that in the mid-1990s, Japan reached a level of income and economic 
development in which democracy substantially functioned, and so Japan was in a 
matured state.  Consequently, as pointed out by Guesh (1997), stronger democracy 
subdues the negative effect of government size on economic growth.  That is, it can be 
argued that the relationship between government size and life satisfaction evolves 
under the influence of changes in circumstances. It is, however, not obvious whether the 
findings of this paper hold generally, since country specific characteristics such as 
historical events and institutional conditions seem to influence growth and life 
satisfaction. For instance, it can be argued that inequality of income and land 
distribution impedes economic growth (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994). The literature (Ranis, 
1990; Wade, 1990) reports that several Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan experienced land reform after World War II, resulting in a reduction of land 
ownership inequality. As a consequence, economic growth was augmented. Unlike some 
Asian countries, countries without the experience of land reform are thought to 
encounter difficulties promoting growth (Ranis 1990; Wade, 1990). In the long term, 
such institutional differences are likely to cause differences in life satisfaction among 
countries. If the institutions impeding economic growth persist, government size 
appears to continue to be negatively associated with life satisfaction.  
In a case study of a country, it is difficult to find proxy variables to appropriately 
capture the changes of circumstance such as democracy and other formal institution 
influences. Therefore, to investigate how the results can be generalized, additional 
international comparative study is required. Further, limitations inherent in the data of 
this study, deduced from aggregated prefecture-level data, do not allow me to more 
closely and directly explore life satisfaction at the individual level. For instance, 
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individual characteristics such as the degree of trust, employment and birth year are 
required to scrutinize the assertion as above (e.g., DiTella et al., 2003; Helliwell, 2003; 
Bjørnskov et al., 2008a; 2008b). Further research will be necessary to more closely 
investigate these factors.  
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(c) 1996 
Fig.1 Government expenditure and life satisfaction. 
Note.  Government size is a log of government expenditure over total income. Life 
satisfaction is a log of the rate of respondents who feel satisfaction with their life. 
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(c) 1996 
Fig.2 Government expenditure and growth rate of real per capita income. 
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Note. Government size is ln(Government expenditure/ Income). The growth rates 
during 1979-1984 and 1996-2001 are presented in the 1979 and 1996 columns, 
respectively. 
 
Table 1.  Comparison between 1979 and 1996 (%) 
(a) Life satisfaction 
  1979 1996 t-value 
All sample  73.6 
 
82.9 12.7** 
Male 
 
68.9 81.4 11.4** 
Female 
 
78.3 84.5 7.9** 
 
(b) Government expenditure rate, Regional real per capita income, and 
Growth rate of real per capita income. 
  1979 1996 t-value 
Government 
expenditure (%) 
   15.7 17.0 1.06 
Real per capita income 
(Thousands yens) 
2,092 3,009 10.7** 
Growth rate (%) 15.1 -0.1 17.2** 
 
Human capital index 
 
1.02 1.04 8.24** 
 
Note. Absolute t-values are presented. ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  The growth rates during 1979-1984 and 1996-2001 are presented in the 
1979 and 1996 columns, respectively.  
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Table 2.  Life satisfaction by generation in 1979 and 1996 (%) 
(1)  
     Male       Female 
Generation 1979 1996  1979 1996 
16-40   63.1 
 
 90.5   74.5   88.5 
41-60 
 
 63.5  72.8   75.0   78.7 
60_ 
 
79.9 80.8  85.5  86.4 
 
Note. Categories for 1979 are 16-40 years old, 41-60 years old and over 61 years old. 
Categories for 1996 are 16-30 years old, 31-55 years old and over 56 years old; for 
comparisons these categories are, respectively, taken as roughly equivalent to those of 
1979.  
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Table 3.  Variable definitions and basic statistics 
 
Variables Definition  Mean Standard 
deviation 
GOVSCAL Government expenditure/ Income 
(%) 
  16.3 5.61 
NETRUST 
 
Rates of respondent trusting 
neighbors (%) 
 47.4 10.1 
RETRUST Rates of respondent trusting 
relatives (%) 
 68.2   6.8 
INCOM 
 
Regional real per capita income 
(thousands of Yen). 
 2,550 616 
POP 
 
Number of population (thousands). 2,516 2,292 
GINI 
 
Gini coefficient of income 0.27 0.02 
HC 
 
Human capital index 1.04 0.03 
Age_1640 
    
Generation between 16 and 40 
years old dummy 
0.33 0.47 
Age_4160 
   
Generation between 41 and 60 
years old dummy 
0.33  0.47 
Female  
    
Female dummy 0.50 0.50 
Year_1979 
 
1979 year dummy 0.50 0.50 
Note. Values are simple averages. Data source is the Japan Broadcasting Corporation 
(1979; 1996), Asahi Shimbun (2004), Index Publishing (2006) and the Statistics Bureau 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (various years).  The 
definitions of generation dummy variables correspond to those in Table 2. 
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Table 4.  Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life. (OLS model) 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
(2)1979 
& 1996 
MALE 
(3) 1979  
& 1996 
FEMALE 
(4)1979 
 
 
(5)1979 
MALE 
(6)1979 
FEMALE 
(7)1996 (8)1996 
MALE 
(9)1996 
FEMALE 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.06** 
(-3.02) 
-0.08** 
(-2.55) 
-0.04* 
(-1.93) 
-0.14** 
(-4.68) 
-0.20** 
(-4.69) 
-0.09** 
(-2.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.72) 
-0.02 
(-1.09) 
-0.002 
(-0.12) 
Ln(NETRUST) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.005 
(-0.13) 
-0.009 
(-0.32) 
-0.01 
(-0.51) 
0.02 
(0.59) 
-0.06* 
(-1.94) 
0.008 
(0.31) 
0.03 
(0.92) 
0.02 
(0.60) 
Ln(RETRUST) 0.32** 
(8.47) 
0.35** 
(5.85) 
0.27** 
(7.32) 
0.14** 
(2.55) 
0.05 
(0.64) 
0.24** 
(3.66) 
0.10** 
(2.79) 
0.03 
(0.66) 
0.16** 
(4.16) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
0.02 
(0.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
0.04 
(1.05) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(-0.95) 
0.04 
(0.71) 
0.08* 
(2.01) 
0.07 
(1.34) 
0.08* 
(1.94) 
Ln(POP) 
 
-0.01* 
(-2.15) 
-0.01 
(-1.33) 
-0.01* 
(-2.02) 
-0.03** 
(-3.43) 
-0.04** 
(-2.72) 
-0.02* 
(-2.19) 
-0.009 
(-1.20) 
-0.01 
(-0.82) 
-0.008 
(-1.03) 
Ln(GINI) 
 
-0.22** 
(-3.38) 
-0.24** 
(-2.41) 
-0.19** 
(-2.76) 
-0.36** 
(-3.85) 
-0.39** 
(-3.24) 
-0.34** 
(-2.64) 
-0.04 
(-0.61) 
-0.03 
(-0.38) 
-0.04 
(-0.51) 
Ln(HC) 
 
0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.03 
(-0.10) 
0.11 
(0.56) 
-0.44* 
(-1.93) 
-0.61* 
(-1.99) 
-0.33 
(-1.13) 
0.15 
(0.85) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.29 
(1.48) 
Age_1640 
    
-0.04** 
(-3.74) 
-0.05** 
(-2.54) 
-0.04** 
(-3.08) 
-0.17** 
(-11.3) 
-0.21** 
(-10.2) 
-0.13** 
(-6.50) 
0.06** 
(6.28) 
0.12** 
(7.33) 
0.03** 
(2.75) 
Age_4160 
   
-0.01** 
(-12.4) 
-0.15** 
(-9.64) 
-0.09** 
(-8.67) 
-0.17** 
(-14.7) 
-0.22** 
(-12.6) 
-0.13** 
(-9.51) 
-0.08** 
(-7.81) 
-0.09** 
(-6.13) 
-0.06** 
(-5.15) 
Female  
    
0.08** 
(11.8) 
  0.13** 
(14.7) 
  0.04** 
(6.13) 
  
Year_1979 
 
-0.15** 
(-6.93) 
-0.21** 
(-6.31) 
-0.09** 
(-3.77) 
      
Constant 
   
-0.49 
(-1.55) 
-0.31 
(-0.64) 
-0.60* 
(-1.72) 
-0.70* 
(-1.82) 
-0.32 
(-0.66) 
-0.84 
(-1.59) 
-0.81** 
(-3.07) 
-0.76* 
(-2.24) 
-0.78** 
(-2.65) 
Obs 564 282 282 282 141 141 282 141 141 
Adj. R 2 0.59 0.60 0.54 0.70 0.70 0.55 0.64 0.73 0.60 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Year 
dummies are included, but not reported to save space. 
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Table 5   Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life (GMM 2SLS model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
   Both NETRUST and RETRUST are treated as endogenous variables and thus instrumented. Six instruments are the logarithm for the number of fire 
fighting teams, logarithm for changing residence within prefecture, logarithm for immigrants from other prefectures, Kanto region dummy, Chubu region 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
(2)1979 
& 1996 
MALE 
(3) 1979  
& 1996 
FEMALE 
(4)1979 
 
 
(5)1979 
MALE 
(6)1979 
FEMALE 
(7)1996 (8)1996 
MALE 
(9)1996 
FEMALE 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.09** 
(-2.54) 
-0.15* 
(-2.23) 
-0.04 
(-1.63) 
-0.22** 
(-3.69) 
-0.30** 
(-3.41) 
-0.12** 
(-2.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.19) 
-0.03 
(-0.94) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
Ln(NETRUST) 
 
0.68* 
(2.04) 
0.76 
(1.62) 
0.27 
(1.38) 
0.53 
(1.39) 
0.59 
(1.34) 
0.29 
(0.90) 
0.42* 
(2.28) 
0.50* 
(2.03) 
0.27* 
(2.18) 
Ln(RETRUST) 0.09 
(0.28) 
-0.46 
(-0.66) 
0.42* 
(1.81) 
0.25 
(0.55) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.40 
(1.04) 
0.35 
(1.50) 
-0.24 
(-0.54) 
0.57** 
(2.71) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
0.03 
(0.64) 
-0.07 
(-0.65) 
0.07 
(1.52) 
0.03 
(0.51) 
-0.10 
(-1.16) 
0.10 
(1.26) 
0.06 
(1.06) 
0.04 
(0.54) 
0.06 
(0.92) 
Ln(POP) 
 
0.001 
(0.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.008 
(-0.80) 
-0.03** 
(-2.33) 
-0.03 
(-1.49) 
-0.03* 
(-1.97) 
0.02 
(1.48) 
0.01 
(0.58) 
0.01 
(1.14) 
Ln(GINI) 
 
-0.17 
(-1.50) 
-0.13 
(-0.74) 
-0.23* 
(-2.27) 
-0.43** 
(-2.60) 
-0.44** 
(-2.64) 
-0.42* 
(-2.10) 
0.08 
(0.74) 
0.07 
(0.49) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
Ln(HC) 
 
1.04* 
(1.82) 
0.77 
(1.20) 
0.62 
(1.51) 
0.39 
(0.67) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.38 
(0.64) 
0.65* 
(1.70) 
0.78 
(1.48) 
0.52* 
(1.74) 
Age_1640 
    
0.18* 
(1.67) 
0.19 
(1.31) 
0.06 
(0.89) 
0.04 
(0.40) 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
0.03 
(0.28) 
0.19** 
(3.26) 
0.29** 
(3.02) 
0.10** 
(2.77) 
Age_4160 
   
0.02 
(0.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
-0.40 
(-0.46) 
-0.08 
(-0.75) 
-0.05 
(-0.70) 
0.02 
(0.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.30) 
0.04 
(0.92) 
Female  
    
0.05** 
(4.04) 
  0.10** 
(6.52) 
  0.04* 
(1.66) 
  
Year_1979 
 
-0.09** 
(-2.40) 
-0.19** 
(-3.60) 
-0.07* 
(-2.19) 
      
Constant 
   
-0.50 
(-1.04) 
0.21 
(-0.25) 
-0.73* 
(-1.91) 
-0.83 
(-1.52) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-1.17* 
(-1.80) 
-0.51 
(-1.08) 
-0.47 
(-0.91) 
-0.38** 
(-0.81) 
Obs 564 282 282 282 141 141 282 141 141 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
3.17 
0.52 
3.23 
0.52 
4.57 
0.33 
5.57 
0.23 
4.01 
0.53 
5.18 
0.26 
0.20 
0.99 
0.98 
0.91 
1.97 
0.74 
Adj. R 2 0.02 -0.11 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.12 
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dummy, Kinki region dummy, and Urban areas dummy. The Kanto region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Ibaragi, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and 
Kanagawa. The Chubu region is comprised of 9 prefectures; Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, and Aichi. The Kinki 
region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama. Urban areas consist of 5 prefectures; Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, 
Osaka, and Hyogo.  
O-I test presents the Hansen‟s over-identification test. 
 
 
Table 6   Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life (GMM 2SLS model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
(2)1979 
& 1996 
MALE 
(3) 1979  
& 1996 
FEMALE 
(4)1979 
 
 
(5)1979 
MALE 
(6)1979 
FEMALE 
(7)1996 (8)1996 
MALE 
(9)1996 
FEMALE 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.15** 
(-2.63) 
-0.23** 
(-2.40) 
-0.08* 
(-1.66) 
-0.40** 
(-4.33) 
-0.49** 
(-3.07) 
-0.30** 
(-3.60) 
0.004 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
0.03 
(1.05) 
Ln(NETRUST) 
 
0.55* 
(1.83) 
0.65* 
(1.70) 
0.19 
(1.02) 
0.29 
(1.15) 
0.57* 
(1.67) 
0.09 
(0.36) 
0.37* 
(2.27) 
0.44* 
(2.08) 
0.22* 
(2.07) 
Ln(RETRUST) 0.35 
(0.98) 
-0.05 
(-0.09) 
0.44* 
(1.96) 
0.47 
(1.17) 
0.17 
(0.33) 
0.40 
(1.09) 
0.33 
(1.13) 
-0.20 
(-0.43) 
0.46* 
(2.23) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
-0.02 
(-0.40) 
-0.13 
(-1.19) 
0.02 
(0.48) 
-0.12 
(-1.65) 
-0.22* 
(-1.76) 
-0.09 
(-1.08) 
0.07 
(0.99) 
0.06 
(0.72) 
0.10 
(1.42) 
Ln(POP) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.81) 
-0.01 
(-0.56) 
-0.01 
(-1.31) 
-0.08** 
(-3.46) 
-0.08* 
(-2.05) 
-0.07** 
(-2.99) 
0.02 
(1.50) 
0.01 
(0.68) 
0.01* 
(1.66) 
Ln(GINI) 
 
-0.13 
(-1.28) 
-0.08 
(-0.54) 
-0.18* 
(-2.00) 
-0.27* 
(-1.74) 
-0.26 
(-1.29) 
-0.20 
(-1.10) 
0.05 
(0.53) 
0.04 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
Ln(HC) 
 
0.71 
(1.29) 
0.52 
(0.83) 
0.38 
(0.89) 
-0.44 
(-1.03) 
-0.53 
(-0.82) 
-0.53 
(-1.19) 
0.63* 
(1.74) 
0.79 
(1.51) 
0.56* 
(2.02) 
Age_1640 
    
0.15 
(1.57) 
0.16 
(1.35) 
0.04 
(0.61) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.007 
(-0.07) 
-0.04 
(-0.58) 
0.17** 
(3.46) 
0.27** 
(3.22) 
0.09** 
(2.86) 
Age_4160 
   
0.01 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.28) 
-0.02 
(-0.54) 
-0.08 
(-1.52) 
-0.07 
(-0.88) 
-0.09* 
(-1.71) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
0.02 
(0.45) 
Female  
    
0.06** 
(4.67) 
  0.11** 
(8.12) 
  0.02* 
(2.03) 
  
Year_1979 
 
-0.14** 
(-3.00) 
-0.23** 
(-4.14) 
-0.09** 
(-2.32) 
      
Constant 
   
0.11 
(0.18) 
0.82 
(0.89) 
-0.33 
(-0.68) 
0.56 
(0.81) 
1.16 
(1.06) 
0.42 
(0.59) 
-0.59 
(-0.96) 
-0.68 
(-1.00) 
-0.80 
(-1.38) 
Obs 564 282 282 282 141 141 282 141 141 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
6.49 
0.26 
3.01 
0.55 
4.83 
0.29 
1.49 
0.82 
1.43 
0.83 
3.83 
0.42 
0.62 
0.96 
1.56 
0.81 
1.18 
0.88 
Adj. R 2 0.17 0.14 0.37 0.43 0.17 0.34 0.30 0.40 0.30 
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Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by the robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
   GOVSCAL, NETRUST and RETRUST are treated as endogenous variables and thus instrumented. Seven instruments are the logarithm for the number of 
natural disasters, logarithm for the number of fire fighting teams, logarithm for changing residence within prefecture, logarithm for immigrants from other 
prefectures, Kanto region dummy, Chubu region dummy, Kinki region dummy, and Urban areas dummy. The Kanto region is comprised of 7 prefectures; 
Ibaragi, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and Kanagawa. The Chubu region is comprised of 9 prefectures; Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, 
Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, and Aichi. The Kinki region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama. Urban 
areas consist of 5 prefectures; Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and Hyogo.  
O-I test presents the Hansen‟s over-identification test. 
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Table 7  Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life (OLS and GMM 2SLS model) 
(a) Male and female 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Male  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Female 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All estimations include constant and the same control 
variables used in Tables 4 and 5.  
# indicates that number of crimes and the number of divorces incorporated as control variables. Results of 
these variables are, however, not reported to save space. 
   Both NETRUST and RETRUST are treated as endogenous variables and thus instrumented in GMM 
2SLS estimations. The instruments used are the same as for Table 5. O-I test presents the Hansen‟s 
over-identification test. 
 
 
 (1)OLS (2)OLS # (3) GMM 
 
(4)GMM # 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.05* 
(-2.22) 
-0.05* 
(-2.13) 
-0.06* 
(-1.85) 
-0.09** 
(-2.53) 
Ln(GOVSCAL)* 
     Year_1979 
-0.04** 
(2.39) 
-0.06** 
(2.83) 
-0.08* 
(2.29) 
-0.12** 
(2.75) 
Year_1979 
 
-0.25** 
(-5.52) 
-0.27** 
(-4.62) 
-0.27** 
(-3.47) 
-0.39** 
(-3.73) 
Obs 564 564 564 564 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
  3.48 
0.48 
7.03 
0.13 
Adj. R 2 0.60 0.60 0.06 0.31 
 (1)OLS (2)OLS # (3) GMM 
 
(4)GMM # 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.06* 
(-1.87) 
-0.06* 
(-1.67) 
-0.13* 
(-1.81) 
-0.16* 
(-2.29) 
Ln(GOVSCAL)* 
     Year_1979 
-0.06* 
(-2.09) 
-0.07* 
(-2.09) 
-0.07 
(-1.55) 
-0.14** 
(-2.38) 
Year_1979 
 
-0.34** 
(-4.88) 
-0.35** 
(-3.82) 
-0.35** 
(-3.07) 
-0.54** 
(-3.53) 
Obs 282 282 282 282 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
  2.98 
0.56 
5.84 
0.21 
Adj. R 2 0.60 0.60 0.12 0.26 
 (1)OLS (2)OLS # (3) GMM 
 
(4)GMM # 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.03 
(-1.36) 
-0.03* 
(-1.57) 
-0.02 
(-1.02) 
-0.03 
(-1.50) 
Ln(GOVSCAL)* 
     Year_1979 
-0.03 
(-1.45) 
-0.05* 
(-2.19) 
-0.05 
(-1.61) 
-0.08* 
(-1.92) 
Year_1979 
 
-0.15** 
(-3.29) 
-0.19** 
(-2.98) 
-0.17** 
(-2.56) 
-0.23* 
(-2.31) 
Obs 282 282 282 282 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
  4.82 
0.30 
7.57 
0.10 
Adj. R 2 0.54 0.56 0.33 0.44 
 40 
 
 
 
APPENDIX   
Table A1. Government expenditure and growth rate of real per capita income. (OLS 
model) 
 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
 1979 1996 
Ln(GOVSCAL) 
 
 -0.008 
(-0.34) 
 -0.10** 
(-2.45) 
 0.04* 
(1.89) 
Ln(POP) 
 
0.004 
(0.38) 
-0.01 
(-0.73) 
0.01 
(1.34) 
Ln(HC) 
 
0.15 
(0.74) 
-0.21 
(-0.72) 
0.24 
(1.04) 
Year_1979 
 
0.16** 
(13.1) 
  
Constant 
 
-0.06 
(-1.05) 
0.06 
(0.66) 
-0.04 
(-0.81) 
Obs 94 47 47 
Adj. R 2 0.76 0.15 0.03 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by the robust standard errors. * 
and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
